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The Eﬀects of Demographic Change 
on Public Education in Japan
Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
6.1    Introduction
Many developed countries are experiencing the population aging. Japan is 
one of the countries experiencing such aging at the most rapid pace. Accord-
ing to the Japanese census, the percentage of elderly over the age of sixty- ﬁ  ve 
increased to 17.3 percent in 2000 from 7.1 percent in 1970. Furthermore, 
the Institute for Social Security and Population Research estimated that the 
ratio would reach 31.8 percent in 2030.
How does population aging aﬀect the structure of government expen-
diture? Median voter theory indicates that the preference of the median 
voter determines the size of government expenditure. If the elderly become 
median voters, government expenditure such as social security and medical 
services, which is directly related to the elderly, will be increased. On the 
other hand, government expenditure such as education, which is not directly 
related to the elderly, will be decreased by the aging of median voters. In 
particular, the local governments in Japan will be aﬀected by this problem 
since the share of their expenditure on education as well as medical and 
social welfare is high. Thus, it is expected that the government expenditure 
on education will be decreased by the increase in the share of the elderly in 
the population.
However, the elderly may support the government’s decision to increase 
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expenditure on education. Poterba (1997, 1998) pointed out several possi-
bilities. First, the elderly may have a long time horizon with regard to deci-
sion making and voting. Expenditure on education is beneﬁ  cial to the old 
as well as the young generations in the long run, because monetary transfer 
from the young to the old generations may be increased by the growth in 
productivity caused by the increase in educational investment.
Second, the elderly may have an altruistic preference. The utility of the 
elderly will be increased by the increase in investment on education to their 
grandchildren or by the increase in consumption of their grandchildren by 
productivity growth caused by investment on education if they have an al-
truistic preference toward their children.
Third, an increase in government expenditure on education may indi-
rectly beneﬁ  t the elderly. The increase in expenditure on education by a local 
government may raise the land prices in that area because the quality of 
education would be higher in that area. If most of the elderly own real estate, 
they would beneﬁ  t from the increase in land prices. Moreover, the elderly 
may beneﬁ  t by the reduction in the crime rate caused by the socialization 
eﬀects of better education.
Fourth, Tiebout sorting (voting by foot) also aﬀects the relationship be-
tween population aging and education expenditure by the government. If 
a local government imposes higher taxes for better education, the elderly 
who oppose the increase in taxes would shift to other areas. In this sense, the 
share of the elderly and education expenditure in the local area are simul-
taneously determined. Thus, the eﬀects of aging on the change in govern-
ment expenditure on compulsory education can be regarded as an empirical 
problem.
Although issues on education have recently attracted public attention 
in Japan, most of the discussions are not based on empirical research. It is 
important to analyze the eﬀects of population aging on public expenditure 
on compulsory education in order to discuss the role of the government 
in providing education. In particular, this analysis is important in Japan 
because Japan is the most rapidly aging society. Figure 6.1 shows the time 
series change in the ratio of people over the age of sixty-  ﬁ  ve in selected 
countries. Among the developed countries, although the ratio of the elderly 
in Japan was relatively low in the 1980s, it rapidly increased from the late 
1980s to the 1990s. In 2000, the ratio of the elderly in Japan was the highest 
among four countries. It is expected that Japanese society will face a higher 
rate of population aging in the future.
Citing the results of Hoxby (1998), Poterba (1998) pointed that the cor-
relation between the ratio of the elderly and government education expen-
diture, which was positive in the early 1900s, has recently become negative. 
However, Poterba (1998) did not empirically test the hypothesis and merely 
speculated that this change in the sign of the relationship had been caused 
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Japan is an ideal testing ﬁ  eld for conducting empirical research on the 
relationship between population aging and public education expenditure. 
This is because the country recently experienced rapid population aging and 
a drastic change in household structures—namely, from extended families 
to nuclear families.
In this chapter, we analyze the eﬀects of population aging on the public 
expenditure on compulsory education using prefectural panel data from 
1975 to 2005 in Japan. The results of the chapter are summarized as follows. 
The higher ratio of the elderly increased the per-  student public expendi-
ture on compulsory education before the 1980s; however, it decreased the 
per-  student public expenditure on compulsory education after the 1990s. 
Since the elderly began to live independently from their children who are 
old enough to receive compulsory education, they may have become less 
concerned about public expenditure on compulsory education. However, 
the reversal cannot be explained by the change in the living arrangements of 
the elderly in our analysis. We speculate that the change was caused by the 
change in the subsidy system on compulsory education from the national 
government to the local governments.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.2 we review previous 
research. In section 6.3 we describe the estimation models and the data for 
empirical analysis. The estimation results and the explanation that the aging 
population had diﬀerent eﬀects on the expenditure on compulsory educa-
tion between the 1980s and the 1990s are presented in section 6.4. In sec-
tion 6.5 we examine the eﬀects of the changes in the living arrangements 
of the elderly on the level of public expenditure on compulsory education 
Fig. 6.1    Share of people at the age of sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over in selected countries
Source: “Population Statistics 2007,” National Institute of Population and Social Security 
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both in the 1980s and 1990s. In section 6.6 we summarize the results and 
note the problems for future research.
6.2    Previous  Research
First, we review the theoretical background on the relationship between 
population aging and the size of government expenditure on compulsory 
education. According to the median voter theory, the size of government 
expenditure is determined by the preference of median voters. Person and 
Tabellini (2000) and Gradstein, Justman, and Meier (2005) show that the 
preference for public expenditure on the education of voters should be 
single-  peaked with income for the existence of a voting equilibrium. Intui-
tively, this condition implies that the demand for public expenditure on edu-
cation monotonically increases with an increase in income (Oberndorfer and 
Steiner 2006). The aging of median voters increases the public expenditure 
on goods and services that are demanded by the elderly. If the elderly do not 
wish to support an increase in public expenditure on compulsory education, 
population aging decreases the government expenditure on education.1
Poterba (1997, 1998) pointed out the possibility of a positive correlation 
between the size of public expenditure on compulsory education and popu-
lation aging. The elderly support the increase in government expenditure on 
compulsory education if they are altruistic toward the younger generation or 
if they are indirectly beneﬁ  ted by the appreciation of land prices, reduction 
in the crime rate, and increase in future productivity owing to an increase 
in the expenditure on compulsory education. Thus, because of theoretical 
ambiguity, the relationship between population aging and expenditure on 
compulsory education is an empirical problem.
In Europe and the United States, empirical research on the relationship 
between population aging and government expenditure on compulsory edu-
cation has been accumulated. Poterba (1997, 1998) analyzed the impact of 
population aging on government expenditure on compulsory education 
(K through 12) using state- level panel data from 1961 to 1991 in the United 
States. According to his estimation results, a 1 percent increase in the ratio of 
the elderly—aged at least sixty-  ﬁ  ve years—reduces the per-  student public 
expenditure on education by about 0.26 percent.
Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) estimated the relation using school 
1. Even parents of school-  age kids would be against public expenditure if the private sec-
tor can do it better. This might be true for high income parents who send their kids to private 
school. However, the percentage of pupils in private school in compulsory education is very 
low in Japan. Of elementary school pupils, 99.0 percent went to public school and of junior 
high school students, 93.5 percent went to public school in 2004. Sugimoto and Nakagawa 
(2007) argued the role of public education on fertility during the industrialized process. They 
demonstrated the vicious cycle between population aging and the undersupply of public educa-
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district-  level data for 1972, 1982, and 1992 because the population struc-
ture and education expenditure changed in school districts even if they 
were located in the same state. The estimated negative eﬀects of the ratio 
of the elderly on education expenditure are smaller than those obtained 
by Poterba—there is a negative correlation between population aging and 
education expenditure.
Ladd and Murray (2001) conducted research using the county-  level data 
for 1970, 1980, and 1990 in the United States. Their results reveal that the 
impact of the ratio of the elderly on education expenditure by the govern-
ment is not statistically signiﬁ  cant.
Using individual cross-  section data, Rubinfeld (1977) indicated that the 
elderly do not tend to vote for policies that increase the expenditure on 
education. Based on household data, Brunner and Balsdon (2004) exam-
ined whether respondents agree with hypothetical educational policies at the 
national and regional levels. They reveal that the elderly tend to support 
an increase in government expenditure on education at the regional rather 
than the national level. However, they do not identify the reason for the pref-
erence of the elderly for local government education expenditure—whether 
the elderly wish to raise the local land price or if they have an altruistic 
preference toward the young generation.
Using the state-  level data from 1990 to 2002 in Switzerland, Grob and 
Wolter (2005) found that an increase in the ratio of the elderly (retired) de-
creases the per-  student expenditure on compulsory education (elementary 
and junior high school). They also showed that the eﬀects of the decrease 
in public expenditure on education caused by the increase in the ratio of 
the elderly are greater than those caused by the decrease in the number of 
students.2
By contrast, no study has been conducted on the relationship between 
population aging and government expenditure on education in Japan. Al-
though Doi (1998a, 1998b) empirically examined the median voting theory 
using Japanese data, he analyzed the determinants of the size of overall 
public expenditure rather than categorizing public expenditure such as edu-
cation.
This chapter is the ﬁ  rst attempt to examine the eﬀects of aging on govern-
ment expenditure on education in Japan. Japan is an ideal testing ﬁ  eld for 
analyzing this problem because it has experienced a rapid change in both 
population and household structures in the last three decades.
Hoxby (1998) indicated a positive correlation between the ratio of the 
elderly and government expenditure in the early 1900s in the United States. 
She also revealed that the correlation gradually changed from positive to 
2. Oberndorfer and Steiner (2006) examined the eﬀects of political variables on higher educa-
tion in Germany. They found that leftist governments increase education expenditure.198        Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
negative in the nineteenth century. Goldin and Katz (1998) showed the same 
change of correlation between population aging and public expenditure on 
higher education.
Poterba (1998) conjectured that the change of correlation between the 
elderly and public expenditure on education was caused by the trend toward 
nuclear families, although he did not empirically examine the hypothesis.
Because there is a growing trend toward nuclear families in the last three 
decades in Japan as well as a rapid increase in the ratio of the elderly, we 
are able to test the eﬀects of population aging as well as the change in the 
household structure on public expenditure on education.
6.3    Empirical  Analysis
6.3.1      The Fiscal System of Public Education in Japan
In Japan, there is a substantial variation in the per-  student government 
expenditure on compulsory education among local governments because 
the cost of compulsory education is borne both by the central and local 
governments. The subsidy system from the national government to local 
governments for the costs of compulsory education is as follows.
The number of classes and teachers are determined by the Compulsory 
Education Standards Law. The law stipulates the maximum number of 
students per class as forty from 1998 (forty-  ﬁ  ve from 1968 to 1997). The 
national treasury burdens of compulsory education costs subsidizes local 
governments for the half the cost of the compensations for teachers in-
cluding lump sum retirement allowance, mutual aid beneﬁ  t (social security 
beneﬁ  t for teachers), travel expenses, and education materials if the number 
of teachers is determined by the Compulsory Education Standards Law. 
After the introduction of this subsidy system in 1952, the Japanese govern-
ment increased the amount of subsidy to local governments for compulsory 
education costs in order to equalize the national level of the quality of edu-
cation. The Japanese government’s equalization policy for the quality of 
education changed the relationship between per pupil education costs and 
the ﬁ  nancial capability of the local government. According to Kariya (2006), 
a positive correlation existed between the per pupil costs of public elemen-
tary school and the ﬁ  nancial capability index of the local governments in 
1965; however, this correlation changed to negative in 2003.
From 1985, the subsidy for compensation for teachers has been gradually 
reduced. In 1985, the Japanese government discontinued subsidies to the 
local governments for the costs of education material and travel expenses. 
From 1986, the subsidies for the costs of social security beneﬁ  ts and the 
lump sum retirement allowance for teachers have been gradually reduced. 
The subsidy for the costs of lump sum retirement allowance was abolished 
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was abolished in 2003. From 2006, the subsidy for the salary of teachers from 
the national government to local governments was reduced from one-  half 
to one-  third of the total salary of the teachers.
At the same time, the discretionary power of local governments on com-
pulsory education has been increased. Until 2003, the local governments 
were not able to reduce the class size below forty students per class. Although 
this restriction was lifted in 2003, the national government did not subsi-
dize the salaries of teachers that exceeded the standard number of teachers 
determined by the standard class size of forty pupils.
Prefectural governments have discretionary power on hiring of teachers. 
Municipal governments were not able to hire full-  time teachers for munici-
pal elementary and junior high schools by their own ﬁ  nancial resources 
because the prefectural boards of education appointed teachers for munici-
pal schools and prefectures bore the salary for the teachers of municipal 
schools.3 Except for the hiring of the teachers, municipal governments can 
determine the size of expenditure on educational costs such as costs for edu-
cational materials, libraries, and travel in municipal schools from 1985.4
There are large diﬀerentials between standard ﬁ  nancial needs for com-
pulsory education—which determine the size of the local allocation tax 
grant for prefectures—and actual expenditure on the compulsory educa-
tion by the prefectures. For example, the maximum value of the ratio of 
actual expenditure on educational materials for compulsory schools to the 
standard ﬁ  nancial needs in the local allocation tax grant for prefectures was 
163.7 percent in Tokyo and the minimum value of the ratio was 35.6 percent 
in Tokushima in 2003 (the average value was 75.7 percent).
As shown in ﬁ  gure 6.2, the subsidies for local governments on compulsory 
education had decreased in the 1980s and had been stable in the 1990s. On 
the contrary, by 1995, the expenditure of local governments on compulsory 
education continued to increase. Figure 6.3 shows the change in the educa-
tional costs per pupil by the national and local governments. From 1985, 
the per- student educational costs by local governments has been increasing. 
However, the subsidy from the national government gradually increased in 
the same period.
These changes in the ﬁ  scal system of compulsory education in Japan 
might have aﬀected the expenditure of local governments on public educa-
tion. As local governments increased the discretional power for determining 
the expenditure on compulsory education, the level of education costs was 
determined by political pressure.
3. This regulation was relaxed in the special zone for structural reform from 2002.
4. Although municipal level analysis would be desirable if municipal level data were available, 
we were not able to get municipal level data in this analysis. Thus, we use prefectural level data 
in this chapter. Prefectural level analysis can be justiﬁ  ed because the share of labor cost is very 
high (about 75 percent from 1997 to 2005) in educational expenditure.200        Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
6.3.2    Estimation  Model
Similar to Poterba (1997, 1998), we estimate the following model to test 
the eﬀects of population aging.
 Educit    1OLDit    2KIDit    3Incomeit    4Aidit
     5Unempit    6Houseit    7Urbanit   uit



















































































































































































Fig. 6.2    Total expenditure on compulsory education by national and local governments










Per pupil educational expense by local governments




























































































































































Fig. 6.3    Per pupil educational expense by national and local governments
Note: Deﬂ  ated by CPI in 2000.The Effects of Demographic Change on Public Education in Japan    2 0 1
The subscripts i and t stand for prefecture and time, respectively. Variable 
Educit represents the per student compulsory education costs of prefecture 
i at time t. Similarly, OLD is the percentage of the elderly who are sixty- ﬁ  ve 
years of age or above, and KID is the percentage of people old enough to 
receive compulsory school education in prefecture i at time t. These variables 
capture the demographic eﬀects on public education costs.
In order to control for the eﬀects of the subsidy from the central govern-
ment, we added the per- student subsidy from the central government to the 
local government (Aid) to the estimation model. Variable House is the house 
ownership rate and it controls for the diﬀerence in the preference with re-
gard to public expenditure on education between households with and with-
out ownership of their houses. Variable Income is the per capita prefectural 
income; Unemp, the unemployment rate; and Urban, the percentage of 
people who live in urban areas. These variables capture the information on 
the income distribution of the prefectures. Variable uit is the error term and 
it is assumed that the error term is decomposed to time eﬀect ( t), prefecture 
ﬁ  xed eﬀect ( i), and the idiosyncratic error (εit), with mean 0 and constant 
variance.
We are most interested in the coeﬃcient of OLD in the estimation. If this 
coeﬃcient is negative, we can interpret the situation as follows: the elderly 
support policies that directly beneﬁ  t them because of their self-  interest. 
On the other hand, if the coeﬃcient of OLD is positive, we interpret the 
situation as follows: the elderly support the increase in public education 
either because they recognize the beneﬁ  t of public education—since they 
are altruistic or long-  term decision makers—or because their welfare will 
be raised by the decrease in crime rate and increase of land prices. However, 
we cannot identify the reasons that the elderly support the increase of public 
expenditure on compulsory education when the coeﬃcient of OLD is posi-
tive in the estimation.
Let us discuss the other explanatory variables. The coeﬃcient of KID 
is expected to be negative because the per-  student public education costs 
would be reduced by an increase in the per capita number of children if the 
total government expenditure on education does not increase along with 
the number of children. The coeﬃcient of House is expected to be positive 
because homeowners will beneﬁ  t from the increase in land prices due to an 
increase in the quality of education. The coeﬃcient of Income is expected 
to be positive since a higher income household would demand a higher 
level of education. The coeﬃcient of Unemp is expected to be negative 
because people may prefer the strengthening of measures for unemploy-
ment to increasing the education quality when the unemployment rate is 
high. Variable Urban is expected to have a negative coeﬃcient since people 
living in urban areas, where private schools are located, may prefer private 
schools to public ones.
We use the panel estimation method with prefectural ﬁ  xed eﬀects. This 
estimation method provides a consistent estimator when the unobserved 202        Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
prefectural factors are correlated with both education costs and demo-
graphic change.
Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) and Ladd and Murray (2001) pointed 
out that the ratio of the elderly might be endogenously determined. Under 
Tiebout sorting, if the elderly are self-  interested, they may shift from the 
high-  quality education area because of higher taxes. In this case, the esti-
mated coeﬃcients by ordinary least squares (OLS) are biased because the 
expenditure on compulsory education and the ratio of the elderly are simul-
taneously determined. To avoid this bias, we use the ratio of the elderly ﬁ  ve 
years ago as an instrumental variable (IV). This variable is adequate as an 
IV because we can consider that the ratio of the elderly ﬁ  ve years ago is inde-
pendent from the current level of government expenditure on education.5
6.3.3    Data
We use prefectural panel data from 1975 to 2005 to estimate the model. 
Since we use the census survey that is conducted every ﬁ  ve years, we use the 
prefectural panel data with a ﬁ  ve- year interval. The deﬁ  nitions and sources 
of the data are as follows.
The amount of government expenditure on compulsory education is 
obtained from the “Survey of the Educational Costs by the Local Govern-
ments” (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology 
[MEXT]). The costs include the expenditures on elementary and junior high 
schools paid by prefectures and municipalities. The numbers of students are 
obtained from the “Basic Survey on Schools” (MEXT). The per-  student 
education costs are obtained by dividing the total expenditure on compul-
sory education by the number of students.
The ratio of the elderly aged sixty- ﬁ  ve years or above (OLD) and the ratio 
of young people aged between ﬁ  ve and fourteen years (KID) are calculated 
from “the Population Census” (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Commu-
nications [MIC]).
The per- student subsidy from the central government (Aid) is the amount 
of subsidy for compulsory education from the central government divided 
by the number of students (“Survey of the Educational Costs by the Local 
Governments”).
The per capita prefectural income (Income) is the prefectural income 
(“Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts” [Cabinet Oﬃce]) divided by the 
prefectural population. The Prefectural Unemployment rates (Unemp) are 
calculated from the Population Census.
The house ownership rate (House) is taken from “The Housing and Land 
Survey” (MIC). This survey was conducted two years before the Population 
Census, which we use for the other variables. We use the ratio of population 
5. Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) and Ladd and Murray (2001) reported that the estima-
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in a densely inhabited district from the Population Census for the proxy 
of the degree of urbanization. We realized monetary variables by the con-
sumer price index (CPI) in 2000. Since all the variables are logarithmically 
transformed, as in the previous research, the estimated coeﬃcient implies 
elasticity. Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables.
Figure 6.4 shows the scatter plot between the per- student education costs 
(Educ) and the ratio of the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve years or above (OLD). 
Although there is positive correlation between Educ and OLD, this correla-
tion might be caused by the other variables. For example, the prefectures that 
have a higher ratio of young people aged between ﬁ  ve and fourteen years 
(KID) show the higher Educ because there is scale economy due to ﬁ  xed 
costs in educational expenditure, as shown in ﬁ  gure 6.5.
Table 6.1  Descriptive statistics
Variable   Observations   Mean  
Standard 
deviation   Min   Max
1975–2005
Per-  pupil local educational expenditure 329 499.43 152.91 267.74 930.95
    Population share of old (%) 329 14.53 5.00 5.27 27.09
    Population share of kid (%) 329 13.11 2.60 7.54 20.55
    Per-  pupil  subsidy 329 2,525.79 555.96 1,484.60 4,884.71
    Per  capita  income 329 235.27 42.77 147.62 377.58
  Unemployment  rate  (%) 329 3.64 1.64 1.23 11.85
    House occupation rate (%) 329 67.83 8.89 39.44 85.73
  Population  density  index 329 47.75 18.61 21.85 98.03
1975–1985
Per-  pupil local educational expenditure 141 358.29 40.14 267.74 547.24
    Population share of old (%) 141 10.29 2.10 5.27 15.32
    Population share of kid (%) 141 15.60 1.10 12.72 20.55
    Per-  pupil  subsidy 141 2,078.50 351.43 1,484.60 3,743.86
    Per  capita  income 141 215.40 34.50 147.62 298.64
  Unemployment  rate  (%) 141 2.70 1.17 1.23 8.09
    House occupation rate (%) 141 68.66 9.76 39.44 85.73
  Population  density  index 141 44.74 18.31 21.85 97.21
1990–2005
Per-  pupil local educational expenditure 188 605.27 116.29 411.65 930.95
    Population share of old (%) 188 17.71 4.10 8.28 27.09
    Population share of kid (%) 188 11.24 1.66 7.54 16.93
    Per-  pupil  subsidy 188 2,861.26 430.92 2,066.31 4,884.71
    Per  capita  income 188 250.17 42.38 171.84 377.58
  Unemployment  rate  (%) 188 4.36 1.59 1.73 11.85
    House occupation rate (%) 188 67.21 8.16 39.59 84.88
  Population  density  index   188   50.01   18.56   24.16   98.03
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Fig. 6.4    Scatter plot between Educ and OLD
Note: This ﬁ  gure plots the relationship between the per-  student education costs (Educ) and 
the ratio of the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve years or above (OLD) from 1975 to 2005.
Fig. 6.5    Scatter plot between Educ and KID
Note: This ﬁ  gure plots the relationship between the per-  student education costs (Educ) and 
the ratio of young people aged between ﬁ  ve and fourteen years (KID) from 1975 to 2005.The Effects of Demographic Change on Public Education in Japan    2 0 5
6.4    Estimation  Results
6.4.1    Base  Model
Let us examine the estimation results of the eﬀects of population aging 
on the per- student compulsory education costs. Table 6.2 reports the bench-
mark estimation results. Columns (1) to (3) in table 6.2 show the estimation 
results by OLS in speciﬁ  cations with and without the variables of unemploy-
ment rate and the ratio of population in a densely inhabited district.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the ratio of the elderly by OLS are not statis-
tically signiﬁ  cant, although they are positive. However, the estimation results 
by OLS might be biased if the unobserved ﬁ  xed eﬀects are correlated with 
the explanatory variables. In order to check this possibility, we conducted 
the Breusch-  Pagan and Hausman tests. First, the random eﬀect model is 
supported between OLS and the random eﬀect model by the Breusch- Pagan 
test. Second, the ﬁ  xed eﬀect model is supported between the ﬁ  xed eﬀect 
model and the random eﬀect model by the Hausman test. Thus, we use the 
ﬁ  xed eﬀect model for estimation.
Figures in columns (4) to (6) in table 6.2 report the estimation results by 
the ﬁ  xed eﬀect model and show that the percentage of people aged sixty-
 ﬁ ve years or above signiﬁ  cantly reduces the per-  student public education 
costs.
Let us focus on other variables. The coeﬃcient of the ratio of people below 
ﬁ  fteen years of age is signiﬁ  cantly negative. This implies that the increase 
in the ratio of people old enough to receive compulsory school education 
decreases the per- student compulsory education costs. The coeﬃcient of per 
capita prefectural income, which denotes the income level of a household, 
is signiﬁ  cantly positive. The amount of per- student subsidy for compulsory 
schools from the central government has a signiﬁ  cant positive eﬀect on the 
per-  student compulsory school costs paid by the local governments. The 
estimated coeﬃcient of the house ownership rate is signiﬁ  cantly negative in 
the OLS; however, it is not signiﬁ  cantly positive in the ﬁ  xed eﬀect estima-
tion. The unemployment rate is not signiﬁ  cant in the ﬁ  xed eﬀect estimation 
when we control the ratio of population in a densely inhabited district. The 
estimated coeﬃcient of the ratio of population in a densely inhabited district 
is not signiﬁ  cantly negative.
As shown in ﬁ  gure 6.1, Japan experienced rapid population aging in the 
1990s, leading to the possibility of structural change in the relationship 
between population aging and the per-  student education costs. Thus, we 
conducted the Chow test to test the stability of coeﬃcients in the estimation 
period. Concretely speaking, we conducted the test for the structural change 
that occurred in the following years—1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. The 
results are shown in table 6.3. According to this table, the null hypothesis of 
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conducted a sequential test for structural change using the yearly panel data 
from 1975 to 2005, eliminating those variables that are only available at 
ﬁ  ve- year intervals—for instance, the housing ownership and unemployment 
rates. In the sequential test for structural change, we test the possibility of 
structural change for every year. First, we conduct the Chow test to test the 
structural change that occurred between the ﬁ  rst and second years. Second, 
we examine the change that occurred between the second and third years, 
and so on. We infer that the structural change occurred in the year that takes 
the maximum value of F (test statistic). According to appendix ﬁ  gures 6A.1 
and 6A.2, which present the results of the sequential tests for structural 
change (Chow tests and cumulative sum [CUSUM] test, respectively), we 
can infer that the structural change occurred around 1993. We estimated 
the model using a separated sample period because the eﬀect of population 
aging on public education costs may have changed between the 1980s and 
1990s, according to the results of the structural change.
Table 6.4 reports the results of the ﬁ  xed eﬀect estimation using the sepa-
rated sample periods—the sample before 1985 and after 1990. Table 6.4 
shows that the estimated coeﬃcients of the ratio of the elderly are signiﬁ  -
cantly positive when we use the sample before 1985. The coeﬃcient changes 
to signiﬁ  cantly negative when we use the sample of the 1990s. The estimated 
coeﬃcients of other variables do not change between the 1980s and 1990s.
Figure 6.6 plots the relationship between the log of the per- student educa-
tion costs (Educ) and the ratio of the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve years or above 
(OLD), after adjusting for KID, Aid, Income, Unemp, House, and prefec-
tural ﬁ  xed eﬀects from 1975 to 2005. There is negative relationship between 
Educ and OLD if we adjust other explanatory variables as shown in column 
(1) of table 6.4. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 are scatter plots for divided samples for 
1975 to 1985 and 1990 to 2005, corresponding to columns (2) and (3) of 
table 6.4. These ﬁ  gures show that the relationship between Educ and OLD 
changed from negative to positive after 1990. In sum, similar to the case 
observed by Poterba (1997) in the United States, population aging decreased 
the per-  student compulsory education costs in the 1990s in Japan.
Table 6.3  Tests for structural change




1995 3.35   0.001
  2000   4.82     0.001  
Note: The Chow test was used to test the structural change that occurred between the ﬁ  rst and 
second years’ statistics.208        Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
6.4.2      Estimation Results by IV
If voting by foot works, the elderly would shift from the regions where 
they have to pay higher taxes to ﬁ  nance higher costs for public education. In 
this case, the ratio of the elderly and the public education costs are simulta-
neously determined and the ratio of the elderly should be considered as an 
endogenous variable in the estimation. Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) 
and Ladd and Murray (2001) used the ratio of the elderly in previous census 
as an IV for the current ratio of the elderly. Since the current level of govern-
ment expenditure on compulsory education does not aﬀect the percentage 
of the elderly ﬁ  ve years earlier, the ratio satisﬁ  es the conditions of an IV. 
Therefore, we use the ratio of the elderly ﬁ  ve years earlier as an IV. Moreover, 
we estimate the model using the divided samples of the 1980s and 1990s.
Estimation results by IV are shown in table 6.5. The ratio of the elderly 
does not have a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on the per-  student government expendi-
ture on compulsory education, either in the entire sample period nor in the 
Table 6.4  Estimation results of the eﬀects of aging on per-  student public education 
costs based on the divided sample periods
1975–2005 1975–1985 1990–2005
FE FE FE
log(per-  pupil educational cost)   (1)   (2)   (3)
log(Population share of old) –0.129∗∗ 0.315∗ –0.495∗∗∗
(0.0601) (0.174) (0.116)
log(Population share of kid) –0.542∗∗∗ –0.593∗∗∗ –0.775∗∗∗
(0.0714) (0.126) (0.167)
log(per capita income) 0.140∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.151∗
(0.0591) (0.112) (0.0895)
log(per- pupil  subsidy) 0.186∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗
(0.0468) (0.0972) (0.0565)
log(Unemployment rate) 0.00374 0.212 –0.0717
(0.0822) (0.133) (0.197)
log(House occupation rate) –0.00429 –0.0789 0.0255
(0.0246) (0.0581) (0.0440)
log(Population density index) –0.0856 –0.0523 –0.0681
(0.0547) (0.118) (0.114)
Constant 5.842∗∗∗ 2.423∗ 8.527∗∗∗
(0.748) (1.387) (1.407)
Observations 329 141 188
Number of pref 47 47 47
R2 0.984 0.770 0.963
Year eﬀect   Yes   Yes   Yes
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. FE   ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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Regression Adjusted log(population Share of old) 
log(educ expend) Fitted values 
log(educ expend) vs log (share of old) 1975-2005
Fig. 6.6    Scatter plot between Educ and OLD after regression adjusted from 1975 
to 2005
Note: This ﬁ  gure plots the relationship between the per-  student education costs (Educ) and 
the ratio of the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve years or above (OLD), after adjusting for KID, Aid 
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Regression Adjusted log(population Share of old)
log(educ expend) Fitted values
log(educ expend) vs log (share of old) 1975-1985 
Fig. 6.7    Scatter plot between Educ and OLD after regression adjusted from 1975 
to 1985
Note: This ﬁ  gure plots the relationship between the per-  student education costs (Educ) and 
the ratio of the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve years or above (OLD), after adjusting for KID, Aid, 
Income, Unemp, House, and prefectural ﬁ  xed eﬀects from 1975 to 1985.210        Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
1980s. However, similar to the OLS results in table 6.4, the ratio of the elderly 
signiﬁ  cantly decreases the per-  student compulsory education costs in the 
sample of the 1990s when we use the IV method that provides the consistent 
estimator shown in table 6.5.
These results imply that the elderly in Japan have become self-  interested 
since the 1990s and that population aging decreases the per-  student com-
pulsory school costs. The results obtained in Japan in the 1990s are similar 
to those obtained by Poterba (1997) and Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001) 
in the United States and by Grob and Wolter (2005) in Switzerland.
Demographic change has both negative and positive eﬀects on public 
education costs. The increase in the ratio of the elderly population decreases 
the per- student public education costs because of political pressure from the 
elderly. On the other hand, the decrease in the ratio of children old enough 
to receive compulsory education increases the per- student public education 
costs because of the adjustment costs for changing the number of teach-
ers and consolidating schools. What are the net eﬀects of the demographic 
change on public education costs?
According to table 6.5, the 1 percent increase in the ratio of the elderly 
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Regression Adjusted log(population Share of old) 
log(educ expend) Fitted values 
log(educ expend) vs log (share of old) 1990-2005 
Regression adjusted for kid, income, subsidy, house, unemp and density 
Fig. 6.8    Scatter plot between Educ and OLD after regression adjusted from 1990 
to 2005
Note: This ﬁ  gure plots the relationship between the per-  student education costs (Educ) and 
the ratio of the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve years or above (OLD), after adjusting for KID, Aid, 
Income, Unemp, House, and prefectural ﬁ  xed eﬀects from 1990 to 2005.The Effects of Demographic Change on Public Education in Japan    2 1 1
cent decrease in the ratio of children old enough to receive compulsory 
education increases the per-  student education costs by around 0.8 percent. 
According to the population projections by the National Institute of Popu-
lation and Social Security Research of the Japanese government, the ratio of 
the population of children old enough to receive compulsory school atten-
dance will decrease by 29.7 percent from 2005 to 2030, and the ratio of the 
population of the elderly who are sixty-  ﬁ  ve years or above will increase by 
57.4 in the same period. Consequently, the net eﬀect of the demographic 
change will be a 10.2 percent decrease in the per-  student public education 
costs: per- student education costs will be increased by 23.8 percent through 
the decrease in the number of children and will be decreased by 34.4 percent 
through the increase in the population of the elderly.
Table 6.5  Estimation results using IV
1975–2005 1975–1985 1990–2005
FEIV FEIV FEIV
log(per pupil educational cost)   (1)   (2)   (3)
log(Population share of old) –0.0421 0.321 –0.599∗∗∗
(0.0700) (0.246) (0.150)
log(Population share of kid) –0.514∗∗∗ –0.592∗∗∗ –0.795∗∗∗
(0.0725) (0.128) (0.169)
log(per capita income) 0.148∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.125
(0.0595) (0.112) (0.0929)
log(per pupil subsidy) 0.192∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.0470) (0.101) (0.0570)
log(Unemployment rate) –0.0373 0.210 0.0133
(0.0841) (0.142) (0.212)
log(House occupation rate) –0.00313 –0.0794 0.0209
(0.0247) (0.0596) (0.0444)
log(Population density index) –0.0767 –0.0513 –0.0746
(0.0550) (0.121) (0.114)
Constant 5.619∗∗∗ 2.419∗ 8.504∗∗∗
(0.756) (1.393) (1.428)
First stage
log(Population share of old 5 yrs ago) 0.832∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.068) (0.070)
F- statistics 776.76 84.84 196.83
Partial R2 0.743 0.500 0.600
Observations 329 141 188
Number of pref 47 47 47
Year eﬀect   Yes   Yes   Yes
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.212        Fumio Ohtake and Shinpei Sano
6.5      Why Did the Eﬀects of Demographics on 
Public Education Change in the 1990s?
What caused the change from no correlation in the 1980s to a negative 
relation in the 1990s in the eﬀects of the ratio of the elderly on the per-
  student compulsory education costs? Let us examine several possibilities.
First, the disposition of the elderly in Japan might have changed from 
altruistic to self-  interested or from being short-  term to long-  term decision 
makers around the 1990s. However, the following question then arises: why 
did the preferences of the elderly change in the 1990s?
Second, the change in the voting rates might have aﬀected the relationship 
between the ratio of the elderly and public education costs. Recently, voting 
rates have been decreasing in Japan. Moreover, the percentage of young 
voters has dropped, although that of the elderly is stable. Thus, the political 
power of the elderly has been strengthened more than expected as a result of 
the demographic change. This change in voting behavior by age group might 
have enabled the elderly to acquire political power and implement policies 
that are beneﬁ  cial to them.
Third, the change in the household structure might cause the change in 
the eﬀects of population aging on public education costs. It is expected that 
elderly people became self- interested and no longer focused on children and 
grandchildren because the percentage of the elderly living independently 
from their children increased, while the percentage of the elderly living with 
their children and grandchildren as extended family members decreased. 
The estimation results of Hoxby (1998) also indicate that the eﬀects of aging 
on public education changed from positive in the early 1900s to negative 
in the 1990s. Poterba (1998) speculated that this reversal of the eﬀects of 
population aging on public education costs was caused by the increase in 
the ratio of the elderly who lived independently. If the elderly have children 
or grandchildren old enough to receive compulsory education within the 
same household, they are interested in public education and understand 
its importance. However, they would prefer policies that are more directly 
beneﬁ  cial to them than to public education if they live independently from 
their children.
Fourth, the change in the eﬀects of the coeﬃcient of the ratio of the 
elderly on public education costs might not be caused by the change in 
the preference of the elderly with regard to education. Rather, it might be 
caused by the change in the public ﬁ  nance system of local governments, as 
explained in section 6.3.1.
In Japan, the ratio of three-  generation families has decreased, while the 
ratio of single- member families of the elderly has increased. These changes 
in the family structure might aﬀect the attitudes of the elderly toward public 
education.
In this section, we analyze the eﬀects of the change in the family structure The Effects of Demographic Change on Public Education in Japan    2 1 3
on compulsory education. We used the ratios of three-  generation families, 
nuclear families, and single- member families from the census as the explana-
tory variables of household structure. Table 6.6 presents the change in the 
ratios of the family structure variables. During the last three decades, the 
percentage of single- member families of the elderly has increased, while that 
of three-  generation families has decreased, as shown in table 6.6. Thus, the 
Japanese elderly began to live independently from their children when they 
were old enough to receive compulsory education.
Table 6.7 provides the estimation results for the models, including the 
share of single-  member households of the elderly as an explanatory vari-
able to test the eﬀect of the change in the living arrangements of the elderly 
on public education. Columns (1) to (3) show the results of the ﬁ  xed eﬀect 
models for the entire sample, the sample of the 1980s, and the sample of 
the 1990s, respectively. Columns (4) to (6) show the results of IV estima-
tion for the same sample periods. The inclusion of the share of single-
 member households as explanatory variables does not change the estimated 
coeﬃcients of the population share of the elderly. To examine the eﬀect of 
the living arrangement on the public educational spending, we use the other 
types of variables diﬀerent from the previous estimation. The other types of 
variables, such as the share of elderly households or the share of households 
with their children living nearby, are obtained from the “National Liveli-
hood Survey” conducted by the Health, Labor, and Welfare Ministry.6 The 
sample periods are from 1986 to 2004 because of data availability. The esti-
mation results of regressions for several speciﬁ  cations are reported in table 
6.8. Column (1) shows the benchmark result. Columns (2) to (4) show the 
results of adding the living arrangement variables. The negative coeﬃcient 
Table 6.6  Change of household structure (national average: %)
   
Population 
share of old  
Household share 
of three- generation 
family  
Household share 
of nuclear family  
Household share 
of elderly family
1975 9.05 21.99 67.48 5.92
1980 10.25 18.68 58.21 5.84
1985 11.56 17.82 57.95 7.46
1990 13.58 15.95 57.72 9.68
1995 16.31 13.80 57.08 12.33
2000 19.15 11.41 57.26 15.27
2005   21.79   9.45   57.11   18.41
Source: “The Population Census” (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications).
6. National Livelihood Survey is conducted at intervals of three years. It is available from 
1986. Total number of observation is 329 (  47 7 waves), but the ﬁ  gure of Hyogo in 1994 is 
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of the share of the elderly does not change when the living arrangement 
variables are included in the explanatory variables.
The hypothesis that the change in the living arrangements of the elderly 
in Japan caused the change in the preference for public education among 
the elderly was not accepted.
We speculate that the change in the subsidy system for compulsory edu-
cation from the national to the local governments aﬀected the change in 
the estimation results between the 1980s and 1990s. From 1985, the subsidy 
from the national government for the salary of teachers has been gradually 
reduced. Thus, the burden of the local governments with regard to public 
education has been increased in the last two decades. This change is shown 
Table 6.8  The eﬀects of living arrangements of elderly on public education costs (1986 
to 2004)
FE FE FE FE
log(per pupil educational cost)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
log(Population share of old) –0.487∗∗∗ –0.480∗∗∗ –0.470∗∗∗ –0.486∗∗∗
(0.0633) (0.0683) (0.0694) (0.0699)
log(Share of elderly households) 0.0332 0.0608 –0.115
(0.0298) (0.0447) (0.222)
log(Share of elderly households without  –0.0340∗∗ –0.0410∗∗
 children) (0.0149) (0.0172)
log(Share of households with children living  –0.0190 0.0412
 nearby) (0.0230) (0.0723)
log(Share of households without children) 0.0706
(0.149)
log(Population share of kid) –0.708∗∗∗ –0.733∗∗∗ –0.733∗∗∗ –0.715∗∗∗
(0.0743) (0.0748) (0.0749) (0.0755)
log(per capita income) 0.0711∗∗ 0.0680∗ 0.0698∗ 0.0699∗
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0365)
log(per- pupil  subsidy) 0.167∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.0636) (0.0635) (0.0637) (0.0645)
Constant 7.745∗∗∗ 7.845∗∗∗ 7.807∗∗∗ 7.867∗∗∗
(0.684) (0.683) (0.685) (0.724)
Observations 328 328 328 328
Number of pref 47 47 47 47
R2 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.979
Year eﬀect   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes
Notes: Living arrangement variables such as share of elderly households are obtained from the National 
Livelihood Survey (Health, Labor, and Welfare Ministry). The National Livelihood Survey is conducted 
at intervals of three years. It is available from 1986. Total number of observation is 329 (  47 7 waves), 
but the ﬁ  gure of Hyogo in 1994 is not available because of the Hansin-  Awaji earthquake. Figures in pa-
rentheses are standard errors.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.The Effects of Demographic Change on Public Education in Japan    2 1 7
in table 6.5. Although the elasticity of the subsidy for per- student education 
costs was about 0.3 in the 1980s, it became about 0.1 in the 1990s.
As the discretionary power and the ﬁ  scal burden of the local govern-
ments with regard to compulsory education increased, the local govern-
ments began to be aﬀected by political pressure from the elderly voters who 
were less supportive in terms of increasing the public education costs.
6.6    Conclusion
This chapter examined the eﬀects of demographic change on compulsory 
education costs using prefectural panel data from 1975 to 2005 in Japan. If 
the elderly are self-  interested and short-  term decision makers, they would 
try to reduce government expenditure on compulsory education. On the 
other hand, the elderly would try to increase public education costs if they 
are altruistic or long-  term decision makers.
Our estimation results indicate that the higher share of the elderly in-
creased the expenditure on compulsory education per student by local gov-
ernments in the 1980s; however, this relationship was reversed in the 1990s.
We did not ﬁ  nd evidence that this change was caused by the change in the 
living arrangements of the elderly in Japan. Thus, we suspect that the change 
in the relationship between public education costs and population aging was 
caused by the changes in the ﬁ  scal system, which increased the discretionary 
power of the local governments in determining public education costs.
Three issues are pointed out for future research. First, we need a detailed 
analysis of the eﬀects of the changes in the subsidy system on compulsory 
education and on the relationship between population aging and public 
education costs. Second, a municipal level analysis would be more useful 
since there are many more variations in both demographic and education 
costs. Third, the quality of education and demographic change should be 
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